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1. Introduction 
Dental phobia, or extreme dental fear, is a condition that affects approximately 5% of the population 
(Hakeberg et al. 1993, Vassend, 1993). Patients with extreme dental fear are characterised by intense 
physiological arousal and feelings of fear before and during dental treatment. Many of them avoid 
dental treatment completely. Scott et al. (1998) reports that the most common reasons for not seeing a 
dentist were the cost of the treatment and fear of dentists. Dental fear has been shown to be a major 
determinant of both dental health and mental well-being (Kaufmann et al 1992, Hakeberg et al. 1993). 
Aartmann (1997) finds that patients with dental fear have a higher score on general psychological 
distress tests than the general population. 
 
There are numerous reports on dental fear treatment showing significant reductions in dental fear 
levels (see e.g. Ning & Lidell 1990, Liddell et al. 1994, Horowitz 1992, Krochak and Rubin 1993, 
Carpenter et al. 1994, Kent 1985, 1987, 1990, Kent and Gibbons 1987, Smith et al. 1987, de Jongh 
1995, van der Bijl 1992, Ter Horst and De Wit 1993). Even in long-term follow-ups from 2-10 years 
the results are favourable. Positive treatment outcome of dental fear treatments is thus well 
documented. These studies focus on treatment outcomes only. To our knowledge, no treatment study 
has focused on the social desirability of supplying dental fear treatment to the public.  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine if supplying fear treatment in addition to dental treatment to 
patients with dental fear is socially desirable. In order to investigate the benefits of fear treatment 
programs to dental fear patients, an experiment was conducted at the Institute for Clinical Odontology, 
Dental Faculty at the University of Oslo, testing three different fear treatments: Nitrous oxide sedation, 
cognitive therapy and applied relaxation. To investigate the social desirability of supplying these fear 
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treatments, the patients were asked to state their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for the received 
treatment. These WTP statements were then compared with the actual cost of the treatment. 
 
One major problem in treating dental fear patients is the lack of motivation. Many have avoided dental 
treatment for years and the thought of managing a regular dental treatment situation without urgent 
treatment needs seems almost impossible. Thus, these patients are often very sensitive and unsure 
about the benefits from dental and fear treatments. This dental aversion will most probably result in a 
low WTP, in particular before uncertainty about the benefits from the fear treatment is revealed. If the 
aversion is large, it may seriously influence the profitability of supplying the treatment, as patients 
who benefit from the treatment ex post may not purchase it without knowing the outcome.  To 
investigate the effects of uncertainty, we asked the patients' to state their maximum WTP both before 
and after they received the treatment.  
  
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we describe in further detail the design 
of the experiment and the valuation survey. In section 3 we outline the theoretical foundation for the 
analyses presented in this paper, modelling the patients' decision problem and discussing how to 
evaluate profitability of dental fear treatments. In section 4 we present the results and conclusions 
from our analyses, and in section 5, some concluding remarks are made. 
2. The experiment  
From February 1995 to June 1996, patients who contacted the Institute for Clinical Odontology, 
Dental Faculty at the University of Oslo with dental fear problems were invited to attend a treatment 
program receiving dental fear treatment. Three patients were referred from dentists and two from other 
health workers, but the majority of patients made contact at their own initiative or through relatives or 
friends. In total, 65 patients met the inclusion criteria and were assigned to a 10-session treatment 
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programme with random allocation to three contrasting treatment principles: nitrous oxide sedation, 
cognitive therapy and applied relaxation. Half the patients had not been to the dentist the last 10 years 
or more. The average number of years since the last dental visit was 12 years, with a maximum of 30 
years for one patient and a minimum of one year for five patients. The need for dental treatment did 
also vary considerably as one patient did not have to treat any surfaces, whereas the maximum number 
of treated surfaces was 53. The patients paid a small fee for participating (NOK 1000) in order to 
prevent dropout. Only three patients dropped out of treatment. At the end of the treatment, the 
patients’ level of dental fear and general psychological distress were highly significantly reduced. 
 
During the experiment, the patients were asked to answer questionnaires concerning dental fear, a 
general distress survey, an assessment of personality three surveys three times during the experiment: 
At enrolment, before attending the treatment and after receiving the treatment. A separate valuation 
survey was conducted approximately one month after the treatment was finished in order to measure 
the patients' benefits from the treatment. The aim of this questionnaire was to elicit the patients' WTP 
for the treatment and their expectation prior to the experiment. The respondents were, among other 
things, asked an open-ended contingent valuation question (see e.g. Mitchell and Carson 1989 for 
more information) concerning their maximum WTP for the treatment. Before the WTP question, the 
respondents were informed that they were to pay the actual cost of the treatment. Then they were 
asked for the highest cost they were willing to cover in order to receive the treatment. This was done 
to avoid respondents answering strategically to the WTP questions, as some patients expressed 
concerns that their dentist would profit from supplying the fear treatment. In order to analyse the effect 
on the social desirability of uncertainty, the patients were also asked to state their maximum WTP for 
the treatment prior to the experiment. 
 
To evaluate the net benefits from the fear treatment, we need to decompose the total WTP for the 
experiment into WTP for dental and fear treatment separately. This was done by asking the patients to 
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distribute 100 points between the two motivations according to their importance for the total WTP. We 
used a simultaneous approach to decompose the total WTP in order to avoid ordering effects. Ordering 
effects occur when the sequence of valuation questions affects the WTP estimates when a set of goods 
is valued in a sequence. (See e.g. Halvorsen, 1996 for more information)  
3. Theoretical framework 
In this section, we model the relation between the patients' expressed WTP and the benefits they 
receive from the treatment, both dental and fear treatment, before and after uncertainty is revealed. 
Then, we discuss the econometric specification of the model and how to use the data to obtain an 
estimate of the WTP-function. Finally, we discuss how to use this information to evaluate the 
desirability of the project, both for the consumers, the suppliers and for the society. 
3.1. Benefits from the treatment 
We use a two period model, before and after the experiment, for the patient's benefit from the 
treatment. We assume that a patient gains utility from the consumption of goods conditional on his 
dental and mental health, represented by the utility function: 
 
( )tPtDtt HHUU ,;Xr=          (1) 
 
where tX
r
 is a vector of private goods consumed in period t (t=1, 2), tDH  is the patient's dental health 
at period t and tPH  is the patient's mental health at period t. The utility is assumed to increase with 
diminishing returns in both the consumption of private goods and the health capital in all periods. 
 
The patient has the ability to improve both his dental and his mental health capital in the second period 
by investing in dental and fear treatment in the first period. We denote the consumption of dental 
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treatment in the first period 1DX  and the consumption of fear treatment in period 1 
1
PX . The health 
capital in the second period is assumed to be function of the initial health capital and the investments 
in health in the first period ( ( )112 , jjjj XHHH = , j = D, P). The investments in both dental and mental 
health are given from the experimental design, represented by the type of fear treatment offered and 
the number of treated surfaces. Thus, the quantity of the health investment is exogenous to the patient 
after deciding whether to participate or not.  
 
We assume that the patient's motivation for participating is to reduce his anxiety level and to enable 
him to go to an ordinary dentist in the future. The patient is assumed to be able to go to a normal 
dentist if his mental health exceeds a critical limit ( PH~ ). Here we assume that none of the patients 
attending this experiment did have sufficient mental capital to go to a normal dentist in the first 
period.1 Furthermore, we assume that the patient does not know exactly how much his investment in 
fear treatment in the first period will affect his mental health capital in the second period. His 
investment will, however, increase his probability of being able to go to the dentist in the second 
period, given by ( )PP HHP ~2 ≥=π . The probability of not being able to go to the dentist in the second 
period, evaluated in the first period, is thus π−1 . In the second period, after uncertainty is revealed, 
the patient will either be able to go to the dentist ( PPwP HHH ~if 2 ≥ ) or not ( PPsP HHH ~if 2 < ). The 
expected mental health capital in the second period, evaluated in the first period, is thus defined as: 
( ) ( ) sPwPP HHHE ππ −+= 12 .2  
 
Since the patient is not certain how his investment in health will affect him when deciding on 
participating in the experiment in the first period, he is also uncertain about his benefits from the fear 
                                                     
1
 The participants were, however, sufficiently motivated to volunteer for the experiment. That is, their mental health capital 
exceeded a lower limit deciding whether or not to attend such an experiment set in a University environment. 
2
 Here, we assume all factors affecting the patient's dental fear, other than participating in the experiment, to be constant. 
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treatment. The expected utility in the second period, as evaluated in the first period, is thus the 
weighted utility of the patient being able to go to the dentist and not, given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )sPDwPD HHXUHHXUUE ,;)1(,; 22222 rr ππ −+=      (2) 
 
To measure the patient's benefits from investments in dental and mental health, we apply the 
compensating variation (CV), which is defined as the difference in expenditures necessary to be 
indifferent between receiving the treatment and not.3 The expenditure function (C) is defined as the 
minimum expenditure necessary to achieve a given utility level (U ) discounted over the two periods, 
for a given set of prices: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }UHHXUHHXUHHXUts
XpXpHHppC
s
PD
w
PDPD
I
i
ii
I
i
ii
XX
DPXX
ii
=−++
+≡ ∑∑
==
,;)1(,;,;..
min,,;,
2222111
1
22
1
11
,
21
21
21
rrr
ππδ
π
  (3) 
 
where tXp  is a vector of all prices in period t, 
t
ip  is the price on good i in period t, 
t
iX  is the 
consumption of good i in period t and δ  is the discount rate (t = 1, 2 and i = 1, 2, ..., tI ).   
 
Since the outcome of the treatment is uncertain, the CV measure for the treatment, evaluated in the 
first period, will also be uncertain for several reasons. If the patient does not receive the treatment, he 
is assumed to know the state of his mental health capital in the second period, but assumed to be 
uncertain of his dental health capital since he is not able to go to an ordinary dentist. If the patient 
attends the experiment, we assume that he does not know for certain if he can go to a normal dentist in 
the second period, but he will know the state of his dental health capital. That is, we assume all 
damaged surfaces to be fixed in the experiment. Evaluated in the first period, we denote the expected 
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dental health capital and the mental health capital in the second period without any treatment 
( )02DHE and 02PH  and the dental health capital and expected mental health capital with treatment 
12
DH and ( )12PHE . The CV for the experiment evaluated in the first period is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) −= UHEHHHppCUHHHEHppCCV PPDDXXPPDDXX ,,,,;,,,,,;, 12112121021021211  (4) 
 
This is the patient's maximum WTP for the total treatment (both dental and fear treatment) evaluated 
in period 1. In the second period, there is no uncertainty about the effect of the fear treatment if the 
respondent has participated. The patient's CV in the second period for participating in the experiment 
is thus given by: 
 
( ) −= UHHHHppCUHHHEHppCCV PPDDXXPPDDXX ,,,,;,,,,,;, 12112121021021212  (5) 
 
Whether the maximum WTP for the total treatment in the first period (CV1) exceeds the maximum 
WTP in the second period (CV2) depends on the patient's expectations about the benefits from the fear 
treatment and his attitude towards dental treatment. Since all these patients have dental fear, it is 
reasonable to believe that they are reluctant to attend dental treatment programs. If a patient with 
dental fear and risk aversion has rational expectations, his CV for the treatment in the second period 
after uncertainty is revealed will exceed his CV in the first period. This is because uncertainty about 
the outcome of the treatment and dental fear reduces his expected utility and thus his WTP in the first 
period. If the patient exaggerates the positive effects of the fear treatment and the negative state of his 
dental health, it will reduce the effects of the dental fear and risk aversion on his WTP in the first 
period, making the difference smaller.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
3
 See Varian (1992) or Mitchell and Carson (1989) for a discussion of the compensating variation. 
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3.2. Econometric specification 
We approximate the patient's expected WTP in the first period (equation 4) by a linear function of the 
patient's annual gross income (Y), the patient's dental and mental health capital in period one 
( 11 and PD HH ) and a stochastic error term (ω ). We also assume that the patient's stated WTP before 
the treatment reflects his CV in the first period, and that the stochastic error term (ω ) is normally 
distributed with a zero expectation and a heteroscedastic variance.4 The expected WTP-function in the 
first period before the treatment is given by:  
 
ωββββ ++++= 1413201 PD HHYWTP       (6) 
 
As a measure of the patient's mental capital, we apply the results from the Symptom Checklist 90 
Revised questionnaire, which is used to assess emotional distress. It consists of 90 items; each rated on 
a five-point scale, where 0 is not relevant and 4 is very important  (Derogatis, 1983). The patients 
mean score of all 90 items is called the global severity index, which is the variable used in the 
estimations as a proxy for the patient's mental health capital. The state of the patient's dental health 
was recorded on the first session as the number of decayed, missing and filled surfaces in all 28 
permanent teeth. Both these measures were recorded at enrolment to the experiment and before and 
after the treatment took place. 
  
Furthermore, we assume the WTP-functions for the total, the fear and the dental treatment in the 
second period after all uncertainty is revealed (see equation 5) is given by: 
 
j
P
j
D
j
P
j
D
jjjj
j BBHHYCTWTP εααααααα +++∆+∆+++= 65432110
2
   (7) 
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where 2jWTP  is the patient's stated WTP for good j (j= total, dental and fear treatment) in the second 
period, CT is a dummy for receiving cognitive therapy, Y is the patient's annual gross income and 
PD HH ∆∆ and  are the patient's change in health capital from the first to the second period. The 
number of surfaces treated by the dentist measure the change in dental capital, and change in mental 
capital is measured as the difference in the global severity index before and after the treatment. We 
also include discrete variables, which measure the perceived benefits from both dental and fear 
treatment ( PD BB , ). These variables equal 1 if the patient reported the benefits from the treatment to 
be low, 2 if the benefits are medium and 3 if the patient reports the benefits from the treatment to be 
high. Finally we include a stochastic error term ( jε ), which we assume is normally distributed with a 
zero expectation and a heteroscedastic variance. 
3.3. Evaluating the social desirability 
One major concern of this experiment was to evaluate whether supplying fear treatment was socially 
desirable. Since investments in health capital must be considered a private good, a competitive market 
insures an efficient allocation when all externalities are reflected by the WTP and/or production cost. 5 
It is reasonable to believe that the patients include all positive effects to themselves of increased dental 
and mental health in their expressed WTP for the treatment. There might, however, be some positive 
external effects to other family members, friends, the labour marked etc. not captured in the WTP 
statements. 
 
The socially optimal provision of the service is where the socially weighted marginal utility and cost 
of providing the good are equal for all consumers and producers. Since an investment in health capital 
is a private good, we may evaluate social desirability by comparing the socially weighted WTP and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
4
 See e.g. Greene (1995) or Battatjaraya and Johnson (1977) for more information.  
5
 See Myles (1995) for a definition of private and public goods. 
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the cost of supplying the treatment for the marginal consumer. The social welfare weights equal the 
marginal utility of income times the marginal welfare weights (see e.g. Johansson 1993, chapter 7). 
Since the social welfare weights consist of two unobservable components, it is not possible to evaluate 
whether the project is socially optimal allocated, regardless of the choice of welfare function. Thus, 
when discussing the social desirability of providing the good, we mainly focus an efficient allocation 
of the good, not the optimal distribution between different patients as measured by the social welfare 
function. We will, however, indicate in which direction including social welfare weights will affect the 
conclusions.  
4. The results 
The treatment outcome of the patients who finished the experiment was very good. All patients were 
able to receive regular dental treatment within the experiment. On average, the patients had filled 13 
surfaces of dental fillings during their exposure part of the treatment programme. Their scores on 
dental fear assessment and the general psychological distress test dropped significantly during and 
after the treatment (see Willumsen, 1999). 
4.1. The probability of being able to go to a dentist  
The patients' motivation for attending the experiment was both to fix their teeth and to increase their 
mental capital. It is thus interesting to compare the different fear treatments' effect on the patients' 
ability to go to an ordinary dentist appointment. In table 1, we present the share of patients for the total 
sample and by treatment groups, who reported that they would be able to go to a dentist by themselves 
after completing the treatment.  
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Table 1. Proportion of the patients expecting to be able to return to an ordinary dentist ap-
pointment after the treatment, for the total sample and by treatment groups. T-value 
in parentheses. 
 Total sample Nitrous oxide 
sedation 
Cognitive 
therapy 
Applied 
relaxation 
Proportion of sample who expect to 
be able to go to an ordinary dentist 
after the treatment 
 
0.69 
 
0.46 
 
0.86 
 
0.77 
(T-value) (1.47) (0.90) (2.49) (1.83) 
 
We see from the table that 69 percent of the patients expected to be able to go to a dentist after the 
treatment, but the results in the different treatment groups differ considerably. Nitrous sedation has a 
much lower success rate than treatments focusing on the patient's ability to handle the situation. The 
fear treatments with a significant effect on the patient's probability of being able to go to the dentist 
afterwards are cognitive therapy and applied relaxation training. 
4.2. Willingness to pay for dental and fear treatment 
In table 2, we present the mean WTP responses for the total treatment, dental and fear treatment 
separately, and the expected total WTP before the treatment started. We also present the T-values 
under the null hypothesis of a zero WTP for the treatment. This information is given separately for 
each of the three treatment groups (nitrous oxide sedation, cognitive therapy and applied relaxation) 
and for all patients combined. 
 
We see from table 2 that the total WTP for both dental and fear treatment is higher after uncertainty is 
revealed than the expected WTP before the treatment. This is true for all treatment groups and for all 
patients combined. The expected WTP amount to approximately 50 percent of the WTP after 
uncertainty is revealed. The relative share of the maximum WTP before and after the treatment is 
highest for the group receiving cognitive therapy (56.5 percent) and lowest for the group receiving 
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nitrous sedation (46.4 percent). This is probably because uncertainty concerning the benefits from the 
fear treatment is likely to be larger for treatment forms applying psychological techniques than 
sedatives. Due to a lack of degrees of freedom, this difference is not significant for any of the groups. 
 
Table 2. Maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) before and after receiving the treatment, WTP for 
fear treatment and WTP for dental treatment. By treatment groups and for all pa-
tients combined. T-values in parentheses. NOK. 
 Nitrous oxide 
sedation 
Cognitive therapy Applied 
relaxation 
All patients 
 Mean (T-value) Mean (T-value) Mean (T-value) Mean (T-value) 
WTP before treatment 2 706 (0.964) 3 618 (0.959) 2 890 (1.128) 3 061 (1.010) 
WTP after treatment 5 833 (2.045) 6 405 (1.691) 5 591 (1.495) 5 938 (1.720) 
WTP fear treatment  2 680 (1.531) 3 126 (1.545) 2 987 (1.525) 2 931 (1.548) 
WTP dental treatment 2 991 (1.625) 3 279 (1.423) 2 870 (1.221) 3 047 (1.418) 
 
4.3. Determinants of willingness to pay 
Looking at the decomposition of the maximum WTP into WTP for dental and fear treatment, it seems 
that, on average, the patients have divided their WTP equally between the two treatments. In order to 
reveal if there are any systematic differences, we estimate a WTP-function for both the maximum 
WTP before and after receiving the treatment and the WTP for the dental and fear treatment 
separately.  
4.3.1. Expected WTP 
We estimate the expected WTP-function in equation (6) applying ordinary least squares (OLS) 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. The results from this estimation are presented in table 3. In the first 
column, the explanatory variables are listed. In the second column, we present the estimated 
coefficient. In the third column, we present the T-values and in the last column we present the P-
values, that is, the probability of falsely rejecting the hypothesis of no effect.  
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Table 3. Estimated determinants of expected WTP (in NOK) before the treatment. 
 Coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 194 0.2933 0.7709 
Income (in 1000 NOK) 9.2 7.6476 0.0000 
Dental health capital in period one, holes and tooth decay 18 1.4366 0.1591 
Mental health capital in period one, psychological strain   509 0.7977 0.4300 
R2   0.26 R2-adj 0.20 
 
Wee see from table 3 that the only variable with a significant influence on the expected WTP is 
household income. If household income increase by 1 000 NOK (approximately $111 US), the 
expected WTP for the treatment increases by 9 NOK (approximately $1 US). If we calculate the 
income elasticity, that is the estimated coefficient divided by the budget share, we find that a one- 
percent increase in income gives a 0.5 percent increase in expected WTP for the treatment. The 
treatment is thus considered to be a necessity good by the patients before the treatment is carried out. 
We also see from table 3 that the expected WTP increases with increased mental stress and the 
damage to the teeth, even though these effects are not significant on an acceptable level (p-value < 
0.1). One reason for the lack of significance and explanation power is the small sample. Out of the 62 
patients responding to the questionnaire, only 54 answered the expected WTP question and only 41 of 
these had observations on all explanatory variables.  
4.3.2. WTP after the treatment 
We now turn to the estimation of the total WTP, and the WTP for the dental and phobia treatment after 
the experiment was over. The results from this analysis are reported in the table 4. First, we look at the 
WTP for the total treatment, presented in the first column of table 4. 
 
Of the 64 respondents who answered the WTP question, 52 had observations on all explanatory 
variables. As we see from table 4, several variables have a significant impact on the WTP after the 
treatment was concluded in spite of the low degrees of freedom. First, income still influences the WTP 
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significantly, where a 1 000 NOK increase in income results in an 8.6 NOK increase in WTP. Since 
the mean WTP after all uncertainty is revealed exceeds the expected WTP by approximately 50 
percent (see table 2), the estimated income elasticity is halved, to 0.25. I.e., a one-percent increase in 
income results in a 0.25 percent increase in the stated WTP. Thus, investments in dental and mental 
capital are less income elastic after the treatment than before the treatment. The stated WTP also 
increases with the benefits from the dental treatment, with the number of treated surfaces, with 
benefits from fear treatment and a reduction in the global severity index, although the last two effects 
are not significant. Whether the patient received cognitive therapy as compared to nitrous oxide 
sedation or applied relaxation do not have a significant effect on the stated WTP. 
 
Table 4. Estimated determinants of the total WTP and the WTP for dental and mental treat-
ment (in NOK) after the experiment was concluded. 
 Total WTP WTP for 
dental 
treatment 
WTP for fear 
treatment 
Constant 4290*** 815 3909*** 
Cognitive therapy 84 -164 426 
Income (in 1000 NOK) 8.6*** 4.2*** 2.0 
Benefits from dental treatment  1041** 871** 324 
Benefits from fear treatment  513 -901** 1385*** 
Change in dental health capital, treated surfaces 165*** 91*** 76*** 
Change in mental health capital, reduction in strain 1651 1356* 210 
R2  0.53 0.46 0.45 
a)
 *** implies that the coefficient differ significantly from zero with a probability of falsely rejecting the zero hypothesis at less than 1 per-
cent. ** implies that the coefficient differ significantly from zero with a probability of falsely rejecting the zero hypothesis at less than 5 
percent. * implies that the coefficient differ significantly from zero with a probability of falsely rejecting the zero hypothesis at less than 10 
percent. 
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In order to examine if there are any systematic differences in the factors determining the stated WTP 
for the dental and fear treatments, we have estimated the model for the WTP for dental and fear 
treatment separately. The results from these estimations are presented in the second and third column 
of table 4. First, we look at the result from the WTP estimation on dental treatment. We see from the 
table that most explanatory variables have a significant effect on the WTP for dental treatment. The 
only exception is the coefficient for receiving cognitive therapy. First, looking at the income 
sensitivity, the estimated income elasticity for the demand for dental treatment is 0.24. This is 
approximately the same income elasticity as for the total WTP. Second, we see that patients with high 
benefits from the dental treatment have a higher WTP for dental treatment than patients who reported 
the benefits to be low. We also find that patients who reported high benefits from the fear treatment 
have a lower WTP for dental treatment than patients who reported low benefits from the fear 
treatment. This indicates that these patients have allocated a larger share of their total WTP to the fear 
treatment than to the dental treatment. Third, we find that the WTP for dental treatment increases with 
both the number of treated surfaces and the measured reduction in mental strain. That is, those patients 
who have benefited most from the treatment, both with regards to the reduction in distress and work 
done on their teeth, are willing to pay more for the dental care than other patients are. Finally, we see 
that this model have a relative good explanatory power as almost 40 percent of the total variation in 
WTP for dental treatment is explained by the estimation. The explanatory power of the model is, 
however, less than for the estimation on the total WTP. 
 
Second, we turn to the estimation results for the WTP for fear treatment, reported in the last column of 
table 4. We see from the table that the level of significance is not as good as in the previous 
estimations. Only the coefficients for reported benefits from the fear treatment and the number of 
treated surfaces differ significantly from zero at a 10 present level. We also see that patients who 
reported high benefits from the fear treatment have as substantially larger WTP for the fear treatment 
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than other patients do. As for the WTP for the dental treatment, this model explains almost 40 percent 
of the total variation in the expressed WTP for the fear treatment.  
4.4. Is the treatment socially beneficial? 
In Norway, dental treatment for adults is privately financed. The Public Dental Service offers 
treatment to children 0-18 years, all mentally handicapped, groups of institutionalised, chronically ill 
and elderly patients. This treatment is offered free of charge or at reduced rates. Until 1995, fees were 
regulated by a fixed fee schedule negotiated between the Dental Association and national authorities. 
The fees for adult patients in the Public Dental Service Treatment are still regulated by these annual 
negotiations. In 1996, the official price tariff had two levels, depending on what kind of treatment 
performed: one high tariff at 604 NOK per hour (which is approximately US$67) and one low tariff at 
497 NOK per hour (which is approximately US$55). The cost of nitrous oxide sedation was 224 NOK 
per hour (which is approximately US$25). 
 
In this paper, we assume that the public dental ward will supply the dental fear treatment. The market 
for dental services in the public ward is not competitive because, among other things, the price is still 
regulated by a set of recommended prices. If the official price tariffs do not clear the market, we will 
experience either excess demand or supply in the treatment of dental fear. Furthermore, we do not 
have information on the actual costs of producing various dental services in the public dental ward. 
Thus, we have to assume that supplying dental services is profitable at the official tariffs and that the 
tariff equals costs at the margin. 
  
In figure 1, we have plotted the patients' maximum and expected WTP per hour for dental treatment, 
by the rank in the WTP distribution. Here, we assume that the patients have the same distribution of 
their expected WTP on dental and fear treatment as for their maximum WTP. The curve to the left of 
the point 0.1 shows the expressed WTPs of the 10 percent of the patients with highest WTP per hour, 
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that is the first decil of the WTP distribution. The median WTP, which parts the sample in two, may be 
read off at the point 0.5. We have also plotted the cost of dental treatment, using the high price tariff 
for active treatment.  
 
Figure 1: WTP before and after the treatment and cost (in NOK) of dental treatment pr. hour. 
Ranked by WTP. 
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We see from figure 1 that patients with dental fear do not have a high WTP for dental treatment as 
compared to the price. Only 54 percent of the patients had a WTP exceeding the cost per hour for 
dental treatment after all uncertainty is revealed, and a little less than 17 percent were willing to pay 
the cost before the treatment started.  
 
In figure 2, we have plotted the patients' maximum and expected WTP per hour for fear treatment, by 
the rank in the WTP distribution. We have also plotted the cost of fear treatment, assuming it to be at 
the low rate of the official price tariff (497 NOK), and the cost including nitrous oxide sedation. We 
see from the figure that the profitability of supplying the fear treatment is higher than for the dental 
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treatment, partly because the cost of providing the treatment is assumed to be lower. A little more than 
70 percent of the patients had a WTP that exceeded the cost of providing one hour of fear treatment, 
whereas 42 percent of the patients were willing to pay the cost before the treatment started. If we 
include the cost of nitrous oxide sedation, the shares are reduced to 56 and 23 percent. 
 
Figure 2: WTP before and after the treatment and cost (in NOK) of fear treatment (including 
nitrous oxide sedation) pr. hour. Ranked by WTP. 
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Based on this discussion, it seems that the social desirability per hour of supplying dental and fear 
treatment differs considerably when supplied to patients with dental fear. We have also calculated 
each patient's net benefit from the experiment in order to evaluate the social desirability of the total 
treatment when differences in need for dental and fear treatment between patients are accounted for. 
The net benefit is defined as the patient's maximum WTP for the total treatment net of the cost of his 
individual treatment. The cost of the treatment was calculated based on the recorded time used for 
different parts of treatment. The mean cost for the total treatment (both dental and fear treatment) was 
NOK 4 344, which is approximately US$483. 
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Figure 3. Expected and total consumers surplus (WTP net of costs in NOK) for both dental and 
fear treatment by income groups. Decil. 
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In figure 3 we have plotted the net benefits and expected net benefits from the total treatment by the 
rank in the distribution. If the patient's WTP exceeds the price he has to pay for the treatment, the net 
benefit is positive, and vice versa. We see from the figure that 71 percent of the patients had a WTP 
that exceeds the cost for the total treatment ex post, whereas only 24 percent of the patients were 
willing to pay this cost before the treatment started. 
6. Conclusions and concluding remarks 
In conclusion, we find that a very small share of the patients participating in the experiment are willing 
to pay what it actually costs to get their teeth fixed before they know the effect of the fear treatment. If 
a combination of dental and fear treatment were offered to the public at the official price tariffs, only 
one out of four of the patients would be expected to make use of this offer. This is because the 
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investment decisions are made in the first period under uncertainty. After the treatment, seven out of 
ten of patients are willing to pay what the treatment costs.  
 
Assuming that all externalities are included, it will not be economically efficient to supply more than 
what the patients are willing to pay before the treatment has started, even if the number of patients 
who are willing to pay the costs almost triples ex post. However, if we are concerned with the 
distribution of well being in addition to an efficient allocation of resources, it might be optimal to 
subsidise the fear treatment in order to increase the demand. First, one may argue that applying 
standard rules for economic efficiency, assuming both rational behaviour and rational preferences, are 
not meaningful in cases concerning treatment of mental sufferings. Thus, the desired level of supply 
may be where the WTP ex post equals the cost, since this is the patients' WTP under full certainty 
about the effects of the fear treatment and with reduced mental stress. Second, the high score on 
general psychological distress tests often seen in this patient group (Aartmann, 1997 and Willumsen, 
1999) may be an indication of reduced ability to function in the work place. Thus, dental fear may 
both have external effects on the patients' productivity and reduce their income. In our sample, the 
mean private income is very low, less than 43 percent of mean Norwegian private income in 1994. If 
this is the case for dental fear patients in general, it has several impacts on the evaluation of efficiency 
and social desirability of the fear treatment. If the external effects in the work place are not reflected in 
the patients' expressed WTP for the treatment, the costs of dental fear is underestimated, and it may be 
economically efficient to subsidise the supply of dental fear treatment. Furthermore, the low income in 
this patient group implies that they have a large marginal utility of income as compared to more 
wealthy groups.6 For this reason, the social desirability of the treatment is likely to be underestimated, 
and it will be beneficial for the society to subsidise dental fear treatment. This is both because of the 
                                                     
6
 Because the marginal utility of consumption is assumed to decline with quantity, it follows that the marginal utility of 
income decreases with income. 
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high marginal utility of income in this patient group and because society often wants to redistribute 
resources to the less wealthy consumers (inequality aversion).  
 
Since we are not able to measure neither the external effects through the labour market, the marginal 
utility of income or the individual welfare weights, it is not possible to determine the exact subsidy 
level which secure either economic efficiency or the social optimal allocation of resources. All these 
effects do, however, suggest that the supply of dental fear treatment should bee subsidised to some 
degree by the government. However, when discussing the social desirability of subsidising dental fear 
treatment, one also need to take into consideration efficiency losses in the economy due to additional 
tax increases in order to finance the subsidies.  
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